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Observers and analysts frequently view Indonesia as a country in which workers' 
rights are few and organized labor is at best a weak social and political force. After a 
brief period of activism and influence immediately following independence, labor's 
social and political role did not grow in tandem with the rise of left-wing parties 
during the 1950s. Following another relatively short period during which labor 
strengthened its political position under "Guided Democracy," workers were 
effectively silenced by Suharto almost immediately upon the rise of the New Order in 1
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1967. Scholars famously characterized the New Order's framework for controlling 
labor as "exclusionary corporatism" and "protective repression."2
Despite some agitation by unions and labor activists in the early 1990s, this 
framework held up strongly. After the fall of Suharto in May 1998, however, an 
opening was created for revisiting this set of restrictive arrangements, and very 
recently workers and unions have shown some signs of at least a modest political 
comeback.3 All of this has occurred in the context of evolving legal institutions for the 
protection of workers' rights and the incorporation of labor into the Indonesian polity.
In 2003 and 2004, Indonesia's parliament, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), 
made a sharp and somewhat surprising legislative break by passing Law 13.2003, 
guaranteeing a variety of labor protections, and then Law 2.2004, establishing special 
courts of labor relations, to be called Pengadilan Hulmngan Industrial (hereafter PHI). 
These special courts were to be established throughout the country and were to 
function as stand-alone entities in parallel to the regular operations of courts of the first 
instance (Pengadilan Negeri).4
Though the PHI were new venues for adjudicating labor relations, Indonesia had 
special courts for administrative disputes since the early 1970s.5 6It now maintains 
special courts for the adjudication of corruption, issues involving fisheries, and 
numerous other kinds of cases/ as well as a new constitutional court separate from the 
Supreme Court.7 Other countries in Asia, such as China, have experimented with 
special courts for cases involving maritime, railroad, and intellectual property issues,8 
among others. As in many of these other instances, an assumption that stand-alone 
courts could both better implement evolving labor standards to protect workers and 
better facilitate the resolution of disputes seems embedded in the logic behind 
establishing the PHI.
2 Terri L. Caraway, "Protective Repression, International Pressure, and Institutional Design: Explaining 
Labor Reform in Indonesia," Studies in Comparative International Development 39,3 (2004): 28-49; Vedi R. 
Hadiz, Workers and the State in New Order Indonesia (London: Routledge, 1997).
3 See, for example, Sabrina Asril, "Buruh Ancam Mogok Massal dan Boikot DPR" [Workers Threaten Mass 
Strike and Boycott of Parliament], Kompas, February 19, 2013, at http:/ /nasional.kompas.com/ read/
2013/02/19/ 15174586/Buruh.Ancam.Mogok.Massal.dan.Boikot.DPR.?utm_source=WP&utm_medium=b 
ox&utm_campaign=Khlwp], accessed February 19, 2013. Also, among the most frequently observed signs 
of a comeback are successful pushes to raise the minimum wage in many provinces, which were 
implemented in late 2012 and early 2013.
4 Caraway, "Protective Repression"; Hurst, "Nascent Protections."
5 Adriaan Bedner, "'Shopping Forums': Indonesia's Administrative Courts," in New Courts in Asia, ed. 
Andrew Harding and Penelope Nicholson (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 209-30.
6 See, inter alia, David K. Linnan, "'Reading the Tea Leaves' in the Indonesian Commercial Court: A 
Cautionary Tale, but for Whom?"; Mark Cammack, "The Indonesian Human Rights Court"; and Benjamin 
H. Tayhar, "The Politics of Indonesia's Anti-Corruption Court," all three of these in Harding and 
Nicholson, eds., New Courts in Asia, pp. 56-80,178-206, 279-98.
7 Hendrianto, "Institutional Choice and the New Indonesian Constitutional Court," in ibid., pp. 158-77; 
Bjorn Dressel and Marcus Meitzner, "A Tale of Two Courts: The Judicialization of Electoral Politics in 
Asia," Governance: An International Journal o f Policy, Administration, and Institutions 25,3 (2012): 391—414.
8 See, for example: Curtis E. Pew, Robert M. Jarvis, and Mark Sidel, "Maritime Courts in the Middle 
Kingdom: China's Great Leap Seaward," The Maritime Lawyer 11 (1986): 237-71; Li Jian, "Debating the 
Specialized Intellectual Property Court in the People's Republic of China," Intellectual Property arid 
Technology Law Journal 19,12 (2007): 17-20; Darcey J. Goeltz, "China's Environmental Problems: Is a 
Specialized Court the Solution?" Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 18,1 (2009): 155-87.
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Though full implementation of Law 2.2004 was delayed by executive order,9 PHIs 
had been established across the archipelago in Jakarta, Surabaya, Makasar, Medan, 
Palembang, Tanjung Pinang, Bandung, Serang, Tanjung Karang, Pekanbaru, 
Yogyakarta, and—at least in theory—also established in conjunction with every 
Pengadilan Negeri located in the capital city of a province or in a locality deemed by the 
president to be an essential center of industry, by early 2006.10 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, workers began filing suits as soon as these venues became available, 
though in some places—including Jakarta—courts were established late or experienced 
substantial problems in their early functioning.11 Many cases were also transferred into 
the new PHI from the so-called P4 (Panitia Penyelesaian Perselisihan Perburuhan) system, 
Indonesia's previous labor dispute resolution venue. Observers and advocates began 
drawing conclusions about the efficacy of PHIs almost as soon as they came into being, 
often noting their slow and cumbersome judicial process.12
Little systematic research on the PHI has been completed to date. The International 
Labor Office (ILO) supported a pro-union Indonesian NGO in compiling a number of 
decisions from PHIs across Indonesia from 2006 and 2007, which it then grouped and 
analyzed by the issues at stake and the rationale employed by the court.13 A scholar of 
Indonesian economic law delivered a conference paper in 2007 that nicely laid out the 
legal basis for the PHIs and their rules of procedure, before going on to present a 
variety of cases from 2006 related to each of the major issue areas PHIs are empowered 
to adjudicate.14 But so far, no one has published full results of research based on 
comprehensive quantitative data examining which sorts of suits have been filed in 
particular courts or what decisions have been issued around the country, though 
substantial data collection work in this area has been completed.15 Also, because the 
NGO report and conference paper noted above cover only 2006 and 2007, it is possible 
that things may have changed in the years since, though more recent analysis shows 
patterns similar to those evident in 2006 and 2007.160nly one PHI—the Bandung court
9 Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia [Government Regulation in Lieu of 
Law] No. 1 (2005); Erman Rajagukguk, "The New Indonesian Labour Court," paper presented at the 
Conference on New Courts in the Asia-Pacific Region, Melbourne, Australia, July 2007, pp. 1-2.
10 Undang-Undang Nomor 2 Talmn 2004 tentang Penyelesaian Perselisihan Hubungan Industrial [Law No. 2, 
2004, Regarding the Settlement of Industrial Relations Disputes, or UU No. 2/2004], Bab III, Pasal 59; 
Febrianti, "Ketua MA Resmikan 33 Pengadilan Hubungan Industrial" [Chief of the Supreme Court Opens 
33 Courts of Industrial Relations], Tempo, January 14, 2006, at http: / / www.tempo.co/read/news/2006/
01 /14/05572305/Ketua-MA-Resmikan-33-Pengadilan-Hubungan-Industrial, accessed September 22, 2012; 
Surya Tjandra and Marina Pangaribuan, Kompilasi Putusan Pengadilan Hubungan Industrial Terseleksi, 2006- 
2007 [Compilation of Selected Decisions of Courts of Industrial Relations, 2006-2007] (Jakarta: Trade 
Union Rights Centre, 2007).
11 Thoso Priharnowo, "Pengadilan Industrial Menunggu Hakim" [Industrial Courts Await Judges], Tempo, 
February 10, 2006, at http: / / www.tempo.co/ read/ news/2006/02/10/05573773/Pengadilan-Industrial- 
Menunggu-Hakim, accessed September 24, 2012.
12 See, for example, Marsen Sinaga Pengadilan Perburuhan di Indonesia [Labor Courts in Indonesia] 
(Yogyakarta: Perhimpunan Solidaritas Buruh, 2006), pp. 74-75.
13 Tjandra and Pangaribuan, Kompilasi Putusan.
14 Rajagukguk, "The New Indonesian Labour Court."
15 Teri L. Caraway, "Final Report: Labor Courts in Indonesia," AFL-CIO paper, available at http: / / www. 
aflcio.org/content/download/28061 /347451 / version/1 /file/caraway.pdf, accessed March 1, 2013.
“ Ibid.
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with jurisdiction over West Java—has made even basic statistical data freely available, 
and these only run up through mid-2009.
This article aims to fill some of the gap in extant scholarship. After placing the PHIs 
in historical and institutional context, I examine, based on field research in Surabaya's 
PHI in 2010, which included both a compilation of statistical and basic data and an in- 
depth reading of selected case files, the patterns and dynamics underlying the PHIs' 
decision-making. Lawmakers and elites appear to have established the PHIs to 
promote the judicialization of labor rights in Indonesia. 17 Plaintiffs may seek 
strategically to engage in a variant of what is often termed "forum shopping." The PHI 
themselves then sometimes must compete with other institutions to assert their 
authority. Alternatively, the PHI can appear incompetent, wary, or confused in dealing 
with certain cases. No pattern appears with complete consistency, but the 
consequences of the disjuncture between competing logics, as well as the gulf between 
clear motivations and messy reality, require further exploration and explanation.
Indonesia's Courts of Industrial Relations: Context and Structure
Context
The PHI were created to replace the Panitia Penyelesaian Perselisihan Perburuhan (P4) 
system, which had been in existence almost as long as the Republic of Indonesia itself. 
P4 organs were not courts, but their decisions had the same force of law as decisions 
issued by the Pengadilan Negeri,18 Following a period of intense labor unrest during the 
post-World War II period and immediately after independence was secured in 1949, 
Indonesia's military moved to prohibit strikes in sectors of national interest and 
threatened harsh penalties against unauthorized strikers.19 But the government still 
saw a need for a new legal and institutional framework.
The P4 system was established by Emergency Law 16.1951, explicitly intended to 
deal with collective actions (tindakan) by workers or managers (i.e., strikes and 
lockouts).20 It also specified the institutional structure of regional (P4Daerah) and 
central (P4P;<saf) P4 organs, noting that P4D should be established in all regions 
deemed necessary by the Ministry of Labor, with rules of operation set by the Ministry 
of Labor and staff drawn from the ministries of labor, interior, finance, 
communications, economics, agriculture, and public works.21 The P4D were to have the 
power to intercede and promote resolution of any and all labor disputes that could not 
be resolved by mutual agreement of the parties. Workers and management were also 
required to seek written permission from the P4D before initiating any strike or 
lockout. Section 4 of the law prohibited any action from being taken for a minimum of
17 Kosuke Mizuno, "The Rise of Labor Movements and the Evolution of the Indonesian System of 
Industrial Relations," The Developing Economies 43,1 (March 2005): 191; Hurst, "Nascent Protections."
18 Sri Hajati, Sri Handajani, Machsoen Ali, M. Zaidun, and Naniek Endang Wrediningsih, Peranan Panitia 
Penyelesaian Perselisihan Perburuhan dalam Menangani Perselisihan Perburuhan (Surabaya: Lembaga 
Penelitian Universitas Airlangga, 1985), p. 41.
19 Peraturan Kekuasaan Militer Nomor 1 Tahun 1951.
20 Undang-Undang Darurat Nomor 16 Tahun 1951 tentang Penyelesaian Perselisihan Perburuhan, Pasal 1.
21 UU. Darurat 16/1951, Pasal 1 and 3.
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three weeks after the P4D had been informed by those involved (the P4D was required 
also to inform the Ministry of Labor and the P4P, either of which, in turn, could extend 
the three-week waiting period).22The P4D were also empowered to establish panels 
(panitia enquete) to investigate further disputes of national interest and were tasked 
with reporting to central authorities why attempts at resolution failed and whether any 
strikes or other actions took place.23
Several years later, after Indonesia's first parliamentary elections, the government 
reinforced key provisions of the Emergency Law, formalized the P4 process, and 
clarified the roles of the P4D and P4P, by enacting Law 22.1957. This law required that 
both parties attempt to resolve any labor disputes and stressed that both had a duty to 
seek mediation or arbitration as a first step if they could not reach agreement.24 Section 
5 established clear guidelines on the representation of various bureaucratic interests in 
the P4D's structure, while section 6 required that the P4D be informed of any group's 
intent to engage in a lockout, or especially to strike, and gave the head of the P4D a 
deadline of seven days to accept such a notification. Only after receiving the P4D 
chair's letter of acceptance could workers strike legally,25 though such acceptance 
letters were, in fact, rarely ever issued in practice.26
Under Guided Democracy in 1964, Indonesia's Gotong-Royong Parliament enacted 
Law 12.1964. The main point of this statute was explicitly to extend the P4 system 
governing dismissals (pemutusan hubungan kerja, or PHK) to private firms. Employers 
were forbidden to dismiss workers absent from their posts for up to twelve months if 
the absences were attributed to religious duties or illness (and, also, to excuse them 
indefinitely for any form of national service).2' Also, before dismissing anyone, an 
employer had to inform the employee and union (if any) of the intended dismissal and 
the reasons behind it, before seeking formal permission from the P4D (or the P4P in the 
case of any intended "mass dismissal" of ten or more employees in a month).28 The 
only exception was for dismissing workers during the probationary period (masa 
percobaan) of their first three months on the job.29 All cases involving dismissals were to 
follow the basic P4 process established in Law 22.1957, with the important new 
provision that either side could appeal a decision of the P4D to the P4P within two 
weeks of receipt.30 Together, this body of legislation established a labor dispute 
resolution system under control of the government (especially the Ministry of Labor), 
reined in workers' right to strike, and required employers to obtain formal government 
permission to dismiss workers.31
22 Ibid., Pasal 4.
23 Ibid., Pasal 6-11.
24 Undang-Undang Nomor 22 Tahun 1957 tentang Penyelesaian Perselisihan Perburuhan, Pasal 2 and 3.
25 Ibid., Pasal 5 and 6.
26 Mizuno, "The Rise of Labor Movements," p. 198.
27 Undang-Undang Nomor 12 Tahun 1964 tentang Pemutusan Hubungan Kerja di Perusalwn Swasta, Pasal 1.
28 Ibid., Pasal 2 and 3.
29 Ibid., Pasal 4.
30 Ibid., Pasal 8.
31 Rita O. Tambunan, Surya Tjandra, and Jafar Suromenggolo, "A Review of Indonesian Labour Law," in 
Asia Pacific Labour Law Review: Workers' Rights for the New Century, ed. Stephen Frost, Omana George, and 
Ed Shepard (Hong Kong: Asia Monitor Resource Centre, 2003), available at http: / / www.amrc.org.hk/
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Relatively little has been published on the P4 system's operation. The Indonesian 
Employers' Association (Perhimpunan Urusan Sosial-Ekonomi Pengusaha Seluruh 
Indonesia, PUSPI) published a guide to the P4 system in 1983, mainly explaining the 
P4D and P4P structure and providing examples of letters and other documents for 
employers seeking to bring dismissal-related and other cases before the tribunals.32 A 
group of researchers from Airlangga University in Surabaya published an academic 
study of the P4 system two years later, in 1985.33 They made the astute observation 
that, although the main role of the P4D was to determine whether or not to grant 
employers permission to dismiss workers, their decisions were often bound up with 
issues of hak and kepentingan (terms sometime translated as "contracts" and 
"conditions,"34but better understood more literally as "rights" and "interests" or 
"standing").35 That is, when determining whether an employer may dismiss a 
particular worker, the P4D also had to rule first on whether that worker (or his/her 
union) had the authority to negotiate, and then on the question of what the worker 
might be entitled to in contractual and legal terms.
Perhaps most useful is a series of decision documents from several years during the 
1970s, published in two volumes by the Manpower Bureau for South and Central 
Kalimantan in 1979.36 The pattern of these decisions bears out the conventional 
wisdom, stated explicitly by the Employers' Association, that the vast majority of cases 
heard by the P4D were concerned with dismissals (PHK).37 What is interesting, 
however, is that most of the cases seem to have been initiated by employers seeking to 
dismiss workers (rather than by workers challenging dismissals). There was 
apparently a great range in terms of the severance and other benefits awarded to 
dismissed workers by the P4 process. As we can see from Table 1, the total number of 
cases filed each year during the 1970s hovered around twenty to thirty-five, much 
fewer than the total of cases filed in the Surabaya or Bandung PHI in the late 2000s 
(though one can imagine the P4D in East or West Java was likely also busier in the 
1970s than its South/Central Kalimantan counterpart).
Nearly all the decisions involved PHK cases and a high proportion of the cases 
involved a handful of employers—mostly in Banjarmasin, but also involving workers 
in lumber, mining, and timber companies from Batu Licin and Kota Baru to Sampit 
and Palangkaraya, and even the employees of a Korean investment and development 
firm. Certain firms, such as a Chinese-Indonesian owned trading company in 
Banjarmasin, seemed frequently able to dismiss workers without paying severance or
node/1182, accessed February 3, 2014. See also http: / / www.amrc.org.hk/ system/ files/ Indonesia.pdf, 
pp. 4—5, accessed February 3, 2014.
32 PUSPI, Panitia Penyelesaian Perselisihan Perburuhan dim Perrmsalahanya [The P4 and Their Problems] 
(Jakarta: PUSPI, 1983).
33 Sri Hajati et al., Peranan P4.
34 Hurst, "Nascent Protections."
35 Sri Hajati et al., Peranan P4, pp. 44—45.
36 Departamen Tenaga Kerja dan Transmigrasi Kantor Wilayah Dit. Jen. Pembinaan Hubungan 
Perburuhan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Kalimantan Selatan/ Tengah Kodifikasi Putusan P4 Daerah 
Kalimantan Selatan dan Tengah (Banjarbaru: Proyek Pengurusan Persyaratan Kerja dan Pengupahan, 1979- 
80).
37 PUSPI, P4 dan Permasalahannya, p. 2.
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having to prove that the workers had acted improperly. Other companies, especially 
plywood and rubber factories, as well as a Banjarmasin nightclub that repeatedly 
appeared before the P4D, seemed most often required to make particularly high 
severance and other payments to dismiss workers. Perhaps most striking, however, 
was that employers seeking permission to dismiss workers initiated the great majority 
of cases, as noted above. Relatively few claims seem to have been lodged by workers 
challenging their dismissal—and most claims workers did make were decided with 
curt letters validating (mengesahkan) dismissals the P4D deemed covered by a prior 
mutual agreement.
Table 1: Summary of Decisions by the P4D for Kalimantan Selatan and 
Tengah, Banjarbaru (years for which data was available)
Y ear*
T o ta l n u m b er of 
cases (im p u ted  
from  d ecisions 
reco rd ed  th rou gh  
at least D ecem b er 
20 o f each  year)
N u m b er of 
cases in  w hich  
a clear
d ecision  w as 
reached
N u m b er 
o f P H K
cases
N u m b er o f 
cases 
clearly  
in itia ted  b y  
em p lo y er
N u m b er o f
cases
d ecid ed  in  
em p lo y er 's  
favor
N u m b er o f 
cases requ irin g  
sev eran ce (or, in 
p aren th eses, 
lesser
co m p en satio n 38) 
b e  paid  to 
em p lo y ee
1 9 7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 ( l ) 39
1 9 7 3 16 11 11 9 9 6 ( 2 )
1 9 7 5 2 2 13 13 1 2 1 2 5 ( 2 )
1 9 7 6 26 2 3 2 3 1 9 1 7 40 7 ( 4 )
1 9 7 7 21 2 0 18 1 8 1 8 9 ( 2 )
1 9 7 8 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3  41 11 (2)
* Year 1974 is intentionally absent due to lack of data.
Three cases stand out especially from the others: one in which the P4D went 
through the enquete process and two in which labor unions pressed claims for back
38 Other compensation may include, for instance, medical, relocation, and housing expenses, as well as 
payment for years of service, known as "cuti tahunan."
39 In one case, the employer (ironically called PT. Gotong Royong, or "Mutual Assistance, Inc.") was 
ordered to pay dismissed employees the greater of one month of salary or Rp.3000 in order to " memberikan 
good will."
40 In one case, the P4D ruled that a Banjarmasin pharmacy had unfairly changed its expectations of five 
workers and thus could not fire them legitimately. In another case, the P4D was unable to decide a case 
right away and moved to establish a "panitia enquete." This panel reported back, and two weeks later the 
P4D issued a nominally separate decision in favor of the Banjarmasin employer.
41 In one case, a lumber company had submitted paperwork meant for dealing with permanent employees 
to support its request to dismiss a contract worker. The P4D advised that, upon receipt of the correct 
paperwork, permission to dismiss the worker would be granted.
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wages owed to members working at a food warehouse and a construction firm 
engaged in irrigation projects. In the enquete case, the P4D sought to determine whether 
a worker had embezzled funds from his Banjarmasin employer and appointed a panel 
of four people (including one lawyer) to investigate and report back within a week.42 
Two weeks later, the P4D decided that the worker could indeed be dismissed for 
misconduct, though he was still entitled to a severance payment equal to six days' 
wages (Rp.9600).43In the case of the construction workers, the P4D found that they 
were indeed entitled to payments of between Rp.1200 and Rp.9600 each, which their 
employer had to pay immediately.44 The P4D decided in a more complex case that, 
although the food warehouse workers had been sent to work at a new location, they 
were still employees under their original supervisor, who had a duty to ensure they 
were paid for all days worked. The matter of back wages for the time spent 
adjudicating their case was referred back to Manpower Bureau authorities in 
Banjarmasin.45 That unions and workers do not seem to have filed more of these 
contractual-type claims speaks to the likely difficulty of doing so and the uncertainty of 
winning any restitution via the P4 process. Other scholarship also suggests that the 
P4D were ineffective at promoting workers' interests and generally served as tools for 
the government to issue permission to employers for dismissals while reining in strike 
activity.46
The foundations of Indonesian labor law and the P4 system came into question 
with the collapse of the New Order. Despite an initially moribund response by labor to 
this opportunity,47 the debate quickly shifted in ways that were at least superficially in 
workers' favor.48 The promulgation of Order Number 150 (Keputusan Menteri Tenaga 
Kerja Republik Indonesia, No. Kep-150/Men/2000, commonly referred to simply as "Kep- 
150") in June of 2000 by then-Minister of Manpower Bomer Pasaribu was a key event.49 50
This edict clarified many aspects of prior labor law, establishing strict criteria for when 
and how workers could be dismissed with cause, better specifying procedures for 
employers to obtain permission to dismiss workers, and laying down clearer formulae 
for calculating severance pay and other benefits due to dismissed workers."1
Law 13.2003 expanded on the reforms of Kep-150, regulating everything from 
required job training, to the use of foreign workers, to the welfare provisions different 
categories of workers are entitled to, and the meaning of labor relations.51 It spelled out
42 Decision document for case 16/ PHK/ P4D/1976, P4D Kalimantan Selatan/ Tengah.
43 Decision document for case 19/ PHK/ P4D/1976, P4D Kalimantan Selatan/ Tengah.
44 Decision document for case 13/M/P4D/1977, P4D Kalimantan Selatan/Tengah.
45 Decision document for case 21/M/P4D/1977, P4D Kalimantan Selatan/Tengah.
46 Mizuno, "The Rise of Labor Movements," pp. 190-211.
47 Jeffrey A. Winters, "The Political Economy of Labor in Indonesia," Indonesia 70 (October 2000): 148-49; 
Tim Lindsey and Teten Masduki, "Labour Law in Indonesia after Soeharto: Reformasi or Replay?" in Law 
and Labour Market Regulation in East Asia, ed. Sean Cooney, Tim Lindsey, Richard Mitchell, and Ying Zhu 
(London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 47-49.
48 Caraway, "Protective Repression," p. 32.
49 Ibid., pp. 37-39.
50 Kep-150, Bab II, III, IV.
51 Undang-Undang Nomor 13 Tahun 2003 tentang Ketenagakerjaan [Law Number 13, 2003, regarding 
Manpower], Bab V, VIII, IX, X.
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clearly the right of workers to form unions, the mechanisms necessary and 
recommended for these unions to function, and new rules for handling strikes and 
lockouts.52 It also expanded upon and codified regulations laid out in Kep-150 on 
dismissals and and severance payments.53
With the issuance of Kep-150 and Law 13.2003, many of the less clear sections of 
earlier labor legislation (often seen as most disadvantageous to workers) were 
overhauled and updated. The handling of labor disputes, however, remained in the 
hands of a state-controlled P4 system that was seen by many as neither willing nor 
competent to protect workers' rights adequately or enforce labor rules fairly and 
efficiently. In this context, and with the aim of improving and depoliticizing labor 
dispute resolution, the DPR created the PHI system with Law 2.2004.
Structure
Law 2.2004 established the PHI, set out their mandate and organizational structure, 
defined where the offices should be established, and specified processes for 
adjudication of labor disputes from simple bargaining and mediation through to trial.54 
It also specified the types of suits that could be brought: hak (rights, often related to 
contractual terms), kepentingan (standing, often in the context of negotiating contracts 
or terms of employment), pemutusan hubungan kerja (PHK/dismissals), and disputes 
between trade unions seeking bargaining or representational rights for workers in a 
given factory (Perselisihan antara Serikat Buruh hanya dalam satu Perusahaan).55 This 
categorization clarified the court's mission and delineated which disputes were 
actionable,56 but, importantly, also recognized the need for the PHI to have a broader 
jurisdictional scope than the P4D (as suggested by the Airlangga researchers back in 
1985).
Law 2.2004's Chapter 3 established that the PHI, unlike the P4 panels, were to be 
staffed by judges, and it set out the qualifications for judges. It also required that at 
least five ad hoc lay judges be appointed to each PHI from labor unions, along with 
another five from employers' federations.57 This was in sharp contract to the staffing of 
P4 panels, which were generally filled with government officials from various 
ministries, and, in practice, it has meant that there has been almost no staffing 
continuity between the P4 and the new PHI.
52 Ibid., Bab XI Pasal 102,104,136-49.
53 Ibid., Bab XII.
54 UU No. 2/ 2004, Bab II-IV; Rajagukguk, "The New Indonesian Labor Court," pp. 6-11.
55 UU No. 2/ 2004, Bab I, Pasal 2; Bab III, Pasal 56; Simon Nahak, "Kewenangan Pengadilan Hubungan 
Industrial Terhadap Upaya Penyelesaian Perselisihan Hubungan Industrial" [Authority of the Courts of 
Industrial Relations in their Efforts to Resolve Industrial Relations Disputes], Kertha Wicaksana 15,1 (2009): 
73-82.
56 Sri Subiandini Gultom, Aspek Hukum Hubungan Industrial [Aspects of Industrial Relations Law] (Jakarta: 
Inti Prima Promosindo, 2008), pp. 61-63.
57 UU No. 2/2004, Bab III, Pasal 70. On the important roles of ad hoc and lay judges in many areas of 
Indonesian jurisprudence, including criminal justice, see, for example: Luhut M. P. Pangaribuan, Lay 
Judges dan Hakim Ad Hoc: Suatu Studi Teoretis Mengenai Sistem Peradilan Pidana Indonesia [Lay and Ad Hoc 
Judges: A Theoretical Study about Indonesia's Criminal Adjudication System] (Jakarta: Papas Sinar Sinanti 
and Fakultas Hukum Pascasarjana Universitas Indonesia, 2009).
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Chapter 4 of Law 2.2004 established rules of procedure for adjudicating cases in 
PHIs.58 PHIs were to function in a manner similar to the ordinary Pengadilan Negeri, but 
with several important departures.59 Panels of three judges, Majelis Hakim, adjudicate 
cases in the PHI—just as in most Indonesian courts, but in sharp contrast to the P4 
panels. But the PHIs' panels are composed of one professional judge (acting as chair, 
Ketua Majelis Hakim) and two ad-hoc lay judges (one from a labor union, the other from 
an employers' group, and noticeably none from any administrative arm of the state).60 
In something of a holdover from the two-level P4 system (in contrast to the three-level 
regular court system), parties to hak or PHK cases have the right to appeal (kasasi) PHI 
decisions directly to the Supreme Court (Makamah Agung), without first approaching a 
higher-level court (Pengadilan Tinggi) at the provincial level.61
Procedurally, when considering cases that involve either hak or kepentingan issues 
alongside PHK, PHIs are obliged to adjudicate those conceptually prior parts of the 
case first, determining the nature and obligations of the relationship between the two 
parties, before dealing specifically with the dismissal (following a sequence the 
Airlangga team suggested in 1985).62 Finally, PHI chairs are required to issue interim 
judgments (putusan sela) if an employer is found to have failed to pay wages and 
benefits while the PHI's decision on a worker's dismissal is still pending.63 This forces 
the employer to pay wages while the parties await the final outcome. The P4 system 
was to give way to the PHI at the end of 2003,64 but the Presidential Order mentioned 
earlier delayed full transition to the PHI system until the start of 2006.
Conceptual Lenses for Assessing the Functioning of the PHI
No conceptual lens from the wider literature is clearly best for analyzing or 
assessing the PHIs' functioning. Still, there are three prominent perspectives on courts 
and dispute resolution that may be of value, and at least some cases do, indeed, 
provide support for each of the three. There are other cases that suggest other, 
unexpected dynamics may be at work, however.
Judicialization
Many have characterized efforts to transfer authority from executive or legislative 
spheres into the realm of courts and legal processes as examples of judicialization.65
58 UU No. 2/2004, Bab IV.
59 Ibid., Bab III, Paragraf 2-3; Rajagukguk, "The New Indonesian Labor Court," p. 13.
60 UU No. 2/2004, Bab IV, Pasal 88.
61 Ibid., Bab IV, Pasal 110.
62 UU No. 2/2004, Bab IV, Pasal 86.
63 Ibid., Bab IV, Pasal 96; UU No. 13/2003, Pasal 155.
64 Agriceli— Tempo News Room, "Panitia PenyelesaianPerselisihanPerburuhan Akan Dilikuidasi" [P4 
Panels to be Disbanded], Tempo, December 16, 2003, http: / / www.tempo.co/read/news/2003/12/16/ 
05635694/Panitia-Penyelesaian-Perselisihan-Perburuhan-Akan-Dilikuidasi, accessed February 23, 2013.
65 Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2000); Marin M. Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet, Law, Politics, and Judicialization (Oxford:
Indonesia's Courts of Industrial Relations 39
The process also involves the development of formal, "triadic" (involving an impartial 
judge or arbiter in addition to the two parties), dispute-resolution mechanisms to 
govern a particular set of activities or group of peopled Prominent authors have 
recently applied and refined this idea in discussions of courts in authoritarian- and 
developing-country contexts.6'
Judicialization thus usually entails either the extension of state power into 
previously unregulated realms of social interaction or state attempts to reduce the 
degree of direct executive coercion needed to achieve resolution of disputes. Both of 
these actions strengthen and streamline the state's apparatus of social control, 
simultaneously bolstering the regime's popular and international legitimacy. To the 
degree that PHIs have assumed authority over the resolution of labor disputes in some 
normatively and politically accepted way, becoming and remaining fully independent 
of executive or legislative branches of the state, we can say that the resolution of 
Indonesian labor disputes has been judicialized.68This, again, appears to have been a 
primary goal of creating the PHI system, but it is far from clear that it has been 
realized.
Forum Shopping
The concept of forum shopping has a venerable history in American jurisprudence 
and legal scholarship, dating all the way back to the Supreme Court's landmark 1842 
Swift v. Tyson ruling.69 Forum shopping occurs when different courts can apply 
substantively different law or reasoning to the same matter, jurisdiction is unclear or 
malleable, and plaintiffs seek out a forum most favorable to their case. Though the US 
Supreme Court acted seventy-five years ago to reduce opportunities for forum 
shopping in the federal courts,70 it remains an oft-noticed phenomenon in the United 
States and beyond. 67890
Oxford University Press, 2002); and Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences o f the 
New Constitutionalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).
66 Alec Stone Sweet, "Judicialization and the Construction of Governance," Comparative Political Studies, 
32,2 (1999): 164; Martin M. Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981).
67 Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa, eds., Rule by Law: The Politics o f Courts in Authoritarian Regimes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Tom Ginsburg and Albert Chen, eds., Administrative Law 
in Asia (London: Routledge, 2009); Hualing Fu, "Access to Justice in China: Potentials, Limits, and 
Alternatives," in Legal Reforms in China and Vietnam: A Comparison o f Asian Communist Regimes, ed. John 
Gillespie and Albert Chen (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 163-87; John Gillespie,"Exploring the Limits of 
the Judicialization of Land Disputes in Vietnam," Law and Society Review 45,2 (2011): 24—276; Jonathan 
Kinkel and William Hurst, "Access to Justice in Post-Mao China: Assessing the Politics of Criminal and 
Administrative Law," Journal o f East Asian Studies 11,3 (2011): 465-98; Hurst, "Nascent Protections."
68 Hurst, "Nascent Protections."
69 It is worth recalling that Swift v. Tyson applied only to cases in which the "diversity jurisdiction" of the 
federal courts was invoked (that is, when cases were filed in federal court on the basis of the fact that 
parties hailed from different states or when a matter occurred in a state where neither party resided). Also, 
the ruling is unclear as to whether the ruling in Swift v. Tyson was meant to apply beyond the narrow set 
of issues, pertaining to financial instruments, addressed in the original case. It was used as a basis, 
however, for countless attempts at forum shopping in the United States for nearly a century.
70 Its ruling in the 1938 case of Erie Railroad Company v. Thomkins is usually taken as the critical turning 
point.
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Many have noted that policy entrepreneurs and other advocates seek out the most 
favorable forum for pressing their agendas.71 Others have argued more generally that 
organizations, to the extent permitted, search for venues they perceive to be favorably 
disposed to their particular issues or preferences.72 Some have even applied the 
concept to trade disputes and other international negotiations.73 Even where 
jurisdiction and rules are clear, opportunities for forum shopping persist—for example, 
when individuals select specific queues or officers for immigration, motor vehicle, or 
customs processing—and they extend, famously, to decisions over when, where, and 
how to file bankruptcy cases.'4
Forum shopping in Indonesian labor disputes should be easy to identify, but also 
relatively rare, as rules and jurisdiction are clear. If we see clusters of particular types 
of cases in specific venues, this could suggest forum-shopping behavior. More 
importantly, if different courts or adjudication bodies appear to be applying 
substantively different legal standards or procedures, this could show that the system 
is at least potentially open to such strategic choices of venue. Also, the fact that the 
resolution of labor disputes can take place in any of three stages—Manpower Bureau 
arbitration, the PHI, and on appeal to the Supreme Court—almost requires parties to 
be strategic about how they pursue their cases at each stage (which is not exactly 
forum shopping, but certainly can amount to differential presentation across several 
venues).
Bureaucratic Competition
Bureaucratic competition involves contestation over political or regulatory power 
by agencies or institutions with overlapping jurisdictions or authority. This condition 
can produce a variety of outcomes, from political paralysis to heightened efficiency, 
but it always entails a struggle between rival bureaucratic actors for control over some 
aspect of state power. Recently, many scholars of Chinese politics have deployed this 
concept to describe a variety of phenomena.
Andrew Mertha and Douglas Grob have found bureaucratic competition 
improving governance and promoting Chinese legal development. In his study of 
copyright and intellectual property enforcement, Mertha found that rival Chinese 
agencies competed in what he calls "policy enforcement markets" for the authority to 
rein in counterfeiters and makers of pirated goods.75 Grob, meanwhile, found tensions 
between the horizontally linked legal affairs office (fazhiban) at each level of
71 See, for example, Frank R. Baumgartner, Bryan D. Jones, and Michael C. MacLeod, "The Evolution of 
Legislative Jurisdictions," The Journal o f Politics 62,2 (2000): 323.
72 See, for example, Sarah B. Pralle, "Shopping Around: Environmental Organization and the Search for 
Policy Venues," in Advocacy Organization and Collective Action, ed. Aseem Prakash and Mary Kay Gugerty 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 177-202.
73 See, for example, Marc L. Busch, "International Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in 
International Trade," International Organization 61,4 (2007): 735-61.
74 Lynn M. LoPucki and William C. Whitford, "Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies," 1991 Wisconsin Law Review (1991): 13.
75 Andrew C. Mertha, "Policy Enforcement Markets: How Bureaucratic Redundancy Contributes to 
Effective Intellectual Property Implementation in China," Comparative Politics 38,3 (2006): 295-316.
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government (which sought to protect local government interests) and the 
corresponding, vertically controlled, justice bureau (sifating), which aimed to 
implement central edicts to popularize legal consciousness and empower the 
citizenry.76
Students of Indonesian politics have noted increasing bureaucratic competition 
since reforms enhanced local autonomy (otonomi daerah) at the end of the 1990s. This 
development, however, has almost always been seen as opening new avenues for 
corruption and malfeasance, thus weakening an already less-than-capable state 
apparatus at the subnational level.77 Decentralization empowers local elites to influence 
policy implementation and weakens direct links between citizens and the central state. 
The loosening of top-down principal-agent authoritarian control provides new tools 
and tactics to local leaders seeking to undermine, exploit, or plunder the local state 
apparatus. Overall, such bureaucratic competition is more reminiscent of Joel Migdal's 
pernicious "triangle of accommodation" 78 79than of Mertha's virtuous "policy 
enforcement markets."
If we find PHIs squabbling with Manpower Bureaus or other courts or arbitrators 
for authority to adjudicate labor disputes, this would suggest bureaucratic 
competition. This dynamic may be strengthened by provisions of Law 2.2004 that 
allow for, even encourage, the use of a variety of dispute resolution mechanisms 
outside of the PHI (called penyelesaian perselisihan di luar pengadilan).79 To the extent that 
PHIs are following a virtuous pattern of bureaucratic competition, we should see their 
contests with other agencies or institutions producing enhanced protections for 
workers or more efficient implementation of the labor law. To the extent that they 
follow a more insidious pattern, we should see heightened corruption or mishandling 
of justice, exacerbated by the extra steps aggrieved workers must take to navigate the 
new institutions and processes.
Something Completely Different?
It is certainly possible—even likely—that none of the above three logics may be at 
work in the majority of cases brought before the PHI. For example, PHIs could simply 
ignore the demands of workers and even managers, taking only the most minimal 
actions when forced to intervene. A particular PHI may also have been so corrupted 
through bribery or other more subtle mechanisms that the forum has become 
systematically biased. It could also be that PHIs lack the competence, either in terms of 
staff and resources or in terms of knowledge and expertise, to adjudicate many cases
76 Douglas B. Grob, "Legalizing the Local State: Administrative 'Legality' at China's Grassroots," in Chinese 
Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary China, ed. Margaret Y. K. Woo and Mary E. Gallagher 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 91-113.
77 See, inter alia: Vedi R. Hadiz, "Reorganizing Political Power in Indonesia: A Reconsideration of So- 
called 'Democratic Transitions,"' in Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia, ed. Maribeth Erb, Priyambudi 
Sulistiyanto, and Carole Faucher (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 36-53; Lorraine V. Aragon, "Elite 
Competition in Central Sulawesi," in Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia, ed. 
Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), pp. 39-66.
78 Joel S. Migdal Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capacities in the Third World 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
79 Nakak, "Kewenangan Pengadilan Hubungan Industrial," pp. 77-81.
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before them promptly and in accordance with the relevant statutes. Thus, even while 
looking for evidence of the three logics above, it is important to remain open to the 
possibility that other factors could be equally or even more important.
Data and Analysis
During March 2010, I received basically unfettered access to the archives of 
Surabaya's PHI. With a population of roughly three million in the city (and another 
twenty-five million in the PHI's area of jurisdiction), Surabaya is the core of 
Indonesia's second-largest conurbation, its largest industrial center outside Jakarta 
(and the most manufacturing-intensive region), home of the naval headquarters, and 
gateway to the eastern two-thirds of the country. It is thus a critical case for assessing 
the new PHI system.
The Surabaya PHI began accepting cases in 2006 and saw an increasingly heavy 
caseload through to at least the end of 2009. Examining basic records of all cases filed 
since the court opened is a crucial first step to understand how this organization 
functioned. Teasing out processes and mechanisms at work requires the analysis of 
individual files in more detail.
Trends Seen in Qnantitatwe Data on Surabaya Cases
In March 2010, I was able to compile basic data on all cases brought before 
Surabaya's PHI. All Indonesian courts keep "registers," usually hand-written ledger 
books roughly 80cm x 40cm in size, in which the type of case, first outcome, and 
subsequent appellate action are meant to be recorded. These vary greatly in quality 
and comprehensiveness. Most registers are destroyed (euphemistically termed "sent to 
the warehouse," "masuk gudang") after about five years. Surabaya's PHI is small and 
staffed by professional and committed judges and clerks (at least some of whom 
specifically asked to be transferred from the prestigious and centrally located 
Pengadilan Negeri to the newly created PHI, housed in a cramped and substandard 
building on a side lane in a working class area near the major industrial areas around 
the Purabaya/Bungurasih Bus Terminal at the Southern edge of the city, close to the 
border with Sidoarjo Regency).
Not all PHI are physically separate from the Pengadilan Negeri. In many smaller 
provinces, the PHI simply occupies an office inside the regular court and uses ordinary 
hearing rooms for its proceedings. In North Sulawesi, for example, the main PHI for 
the province maintains a roughly ten-square-meter office with a staff of three inside 
Manado's Pengadilan Negeri.
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Table 2: Basic Data on Surabaya PHI Cases, 2006-09
2006 2007 2008 2009
Total
2006-09
Total cases filed 192 242 264 274 972
Total h a k  cases 9*'** 33 36*** 28 106
Number in which decision 
known (number decided for 
plaintiff in parentheses)
2(1) 18(7) 26 (12) 16 (5) 62 (25)
Number known appealed 
(number known to have 
overturned original decision 
in parentheses)
2(0) 4(0) 3(1) 0 9(1)
Total k e p en tin g a n  cases 4* 3 7 8 22
Number in which decision 






Number known appealed NA NA 0 0 0
Total PHK cases 179** 204 230*** 194 807
Number in which decision 




















Number known appealed 
(appeals known to have 
overturned original decision 
in parentheses)
5(2) 10(3) 22 (4) 3(0) 35 (9)
Total "other" cases (e.g., conflicts 
involving unions or cases with 
basic details missing)
0 2 2 44 48
* Includes one case deemed both hak and kepentingan
** Includes two cases deemed both hak and PHK
*** Includes eleven cases deemed both hak and PHK
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Surabaya's PHI began accepting cases in 2006 and handles a relatively small 
number of cases. There were never more than three hundred in any given year, 
compared with more than four thousand—roughly 3,500 criminal and more than six 
hundred civil—at Surabaya's Pengadilan Negeri. These factors made data collection, by 
copying basic information from the registers into a notebook in the clerks' office, 
relatively manageable.
Table 2 (previous page) presents the basic outlines of the data from the registers. 
The PHI's case load steadily increased, from 192 in 2006 to 274 in 2009, but not at such 
a high rate as might have been anticipated. Also, in keeping with the history of the P4 
system, more than 80 percent of all cases filed since the court's inception revolved 
around PHK, while very few were related to kepentingan or union representation. Of 
the forty-eight cases in the "other" category, only four dealt with unions, the rest— 
mostly from the latter months of 2009—were missing basic data, as full information 
had not yet been entered into the register at the time of my fieldwork.







Total cases filed (cases 
transferred from P4D*)
250 (125) 196 190 71 707 (125)
Total hak cases 3 20 23 3 49
Total kepentingan cases 4 2 7 3 16
Total PHK cases 118 174 160 65 517
Total decided 142 163 128 47 480
Total cases withdrawn 
or settled
69 45 34 15 163
Total pending at year's 
end (sisa)
39 27 55 64 185
Total appellate petitions 
filed (number of appeals 
withdrawn in 
parentheses)
51 (4) 98 (18) 79 (8) 39(4) 267 (34)
* This was a mostly one-off initiative to close the P4 system known as “Pelimpahan P4D."
Source: Pengadilan Hulningan Industrial pada Pengadilan Negeri Klas IA Bandung [The 
Special Court for Industrial Relations at the Bandung Class 1A Court], Bandung, 
http://www.pn-bandung.go.id/page/ profil-phi, Tables 1-13, a pdf document dated 
May 2009, last accessed November 22, 2012.
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Most cases received by the Surabaya PHI seem to have been brought by workers or 
their representatives, rather than by employers seeking simple permission for 
dismissals. This was in marked contrast to the dynamic of the P4D system as revealed 
in the South and Central Kalimantan decision data. While the success rate for worker 
plaintiffs was slightly higher for PHK cases than for the second leading category (hoik), 
it was not very significantly higher (roughly 43 percent versus 40 percent). 
Surprisingly, according to the register data, very few cases were appealed. This is odd, 
given the streamlined appellate procedure for PHI cases, anecdotal reports, and a 
widespread conventional wisdom among analysts and managers that many (perhaps 
most) PHI rulings are appealed. It is, of course, possible that data from the registers are 
simply incomplete.
Similar general trends are apparent in the basic quantitative data published by 
Bandung PHI, summarized in Table 3 (previous page). There, PHK disputes 
constituted 89 percent of the total caseload (exclusive of the 125 cases transferred over 
from the P4D upon the PHI's inception), with significantly more hak cases (8 percent) 
than suits over kepentingan (3 percent of the total cases). The broadly congruent 
patterns of case filings and court work in East and West Java—two of Indonesia's 
largest and most important industrial provinces—suggest that what I observed in 
Surabaya was more likely representative of national-level tendencies than a locally 
specific aberration.
Processes Apparent in Surabaya Case Files
Gathering qualitative data from case files was in some ways easier, but more hit- 
and-miss, than perusing the registers. I was given full access to files I requested that 
were available on hand in the Surabaya court's archive. My strategy was to select cases 
from the register essentially at random within each frequently occurring category 
(PHK, hak, and kepentingan), with an aim of choosing samples broadly representing 
each. Labor union disputes were adjudicated so seldom that I simply requested every 
file I could identify as such. I also deliberately over-selected and requested files of 
cases that had been appealed to the Supreme Court. Many files turned out to be 
missing or in use by the court (and thus not available). Others were nearly empty or 
otherwise obviously incomplete. Finally, many files for cases that had been appealed 
did not contain all the appellate filing documents or the Supreme Court's decision (as 
they should have). Never, though, did I get the sense that this was due to anything 
other than insufficient staffing and poor archival skills on the part of the court clerks.
I was able to review nineteen case files thoroughly: twelve from cases involving 
PHK, one hak and PHK, four hak, and two kepentingan. Rather than simply reviewing 
these by each issue involved, it is more useful to discuss cases that support or call into 
question processes of judicialization, forum shopping, and bureaucratic competition, as 
well as those that might suggest none of those three processes was at work, or that 
might support alternative dynamics. I supplement each segment with cases from the 
NGO collection discussed earlier from around the archipelago to highlight the degree 




In these cases, we see the PHI acting as seems to have been intended under Law 
2.2004—as an impartial arbiter in labor disputes, taking into consideration both 
employer and trade unionist perspectives, and adjudicating cases according to rules 
and procedures formalized in Law 2.2004 and Law 13.2003. Not surprisingly, many 
cases in which we can observe this dynamic are relatively simple and straightforward 
PHK suits.
In Case 127 from 2007,80 for example, a group of twenty-seven metal workers in 
Malang easily persuaded the PHI to enforce provisions of Law 13.2003 upon their 
intransigent former employer. The plaintiffs sued for back wages and severance after 
all were dismissed in August 2006, after two years on the job. Their employer argued 
that the company's contracts with the employees took precedence over general 
provisions of Law 13.2003 and that the firm had already paid out generous end-of- 
contract bonuses, though witnesses for the plaintiffs disputed this. Eventually, the PHI 
ruled that the workers were due roughly 75 percent more severance money than they 
had received. The employer appealed to the Supreme Court, the result of which was 
still pending when I reviewed the file. Overall, this case depicts the PHI applying the 
law in an impartial and clear manner that also happens to have been beneficial for the 
workers who brought the case.
Another PHK case involved deception by an employer seeking to dismiss a bus 
driver, whose route was being cut.81 The PHI was able to identify this problem, pass 
judgment against the bus company despite the presence on the court of an ad-hoc 
judge from an employers' association, and impose a remedy appropriately grounded 
in Law 13.2003. In this case, the bus driver had worked for a company for fourteen 
years, driving the same Patas bus on the same route without any problems. He was 
sent home, however, when his employer said his bus needed repairs. Eight months 
following this dismissal, the company had given the driver's job to someone else and 
refused to hire him back. At that point, the driver sought mediation from the 
Manpower Bureau in Pasuruan.
The Manpower Bureau first failed to notify the company or call for it to send a 
representative to mediation meetings. Then, when finally called, the company's 
representative failed to appear. So the Manpower Bureau issued a letter ordering the 
company to take the driver back. After the company refused, the Manpower Bureau 
demanded that it pay fifteen months of back wages and a severance package to the 
driver, but the company refused this as well.
This left the driver just one option, to take his case to the PHI, which investigated 
and found that service on his route had actually been cut. The claimed "repairs" on his 
bus were apparently only a crude deception. The PHI also discovered, though, that the 
company did offer to take the driver back, albeit in another capacity, and the driver had 
refused this offer. The driver was thus not entitled to severance pay. Still, the PHI 
required the company to pay him wages for eight months during which he was idled
80 Case No. 127/G/2007/PHI.SBY (file obtained from Surabaya PHI archive).
81 Case No. 75/G/2006/PHI.SBY (file obtained from Surabaya PHI archive).
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by the "repairs." The company appealed to the Supreme Court, but its appeal was 
rejected.
Interestingly, two cases from Southeast Sulawesi bear strong similarities to the bus 
driver's case.82 In those cases, mechanics at a ferry company were placed on 
involuntary leave. In the first of these cases, the company replaced a worker with a 
new employee without first terminating him formally; in the second, a different 
worker was placed on long-term leave while the boats he had maintained were 
overhauled. In both cases, the employer was ordered to pay back wages and ensure 
that the workers could return to their original posts.
The PHI's role as arbiter of the law on PHK issues sometimes extended into the 
terrain of union activities and rights, even when these were not formally part of the 
suit. For example, in one case from Sidoarjo, the PHI stepped in to protect the rights of 
union activists who had been fired for their organizing activities at a printing 
company.83 The three workers concerned, all union activists in the plant for Komisariat 
Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia, filed suit against their employer after they were 
dismissed (without severance payments), allegedly for abandoning their posts.
The workers maintained that their dismissals were, in fact, related to problems in 
the factory that stemmed from management's impromptu decision to pay wages via a 
Bank Mandiri ATM. After work stopped for thirty minutes—during which the 
plaintiffs claimed they explained the new procedures to rank-and-file workers— 
management became wary, withdrew plans for the ATM payment system, and 
summoned the union leaders to a meeting. At the meeting, the workers complained of 
perceived attempts by management to block union activities. In court, they claimed to 
have received letters of dismissal the following day.
The printing company argued that the workers had been suspended (skorsing) prior 
to their dismissals, but had never requested to return to their posts—that they had 
resigned de facto. The defendant also challenged the plaintiffs' legal representatives 
(lawyers from their union) because of ongoing negotiations and disputes between the 
firm and the union. In the end, the PHI ruled in favor of the workers and ordered the 
company to pay them severance, as well as back wages for the time in which their case 
was being processed. The employer appealed, but the Supreme Court upheld the PHI's 
decision, though it did reduce the mandated severance payments.
The dynamics of the Sidoarjo case are also similar to another from Banten.84 In that 
case, the management of a kitchenware manufacturing plant sought to dismiss several 
employees for engaging in an allegedly illegal work stoppage. The workers had taken 
approximately fifteen minutes to gather and listen to instructions and an explanation 
of new rules by management. After this, they were also suspended and then 
terminated. The Serang PHI, like its Surabaya counterpart, eventually decided that the 
workers were entitled to be re-employed in their old positions and receive back wages,
82 Cases No. 2/G/2006/PHI.Kendari and No. 3/G/2006/PHI.Kendari (decision documents reproduced in 
Tjandra and Pangaribuan, Kompilasi Putusan, pp. 430-47, 448-69).
83 Case No. 24/G/2008/PHI.SBY (file obtained from Surabaya PHI archive).
84 Case No. 44/G/2006/PHI.Serang (Banten) (decision document reproduced in Tjandra and Pangaribuan, 
Kompilasi Putusan, pp. 598-627).
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but only if they followed proper civil procedure and filed formal countersuits (gugatan 
balik, or rekompensi).
One of the earliest cases heard in Surabaya's PHI, involving hak and kepentingan, in 
addition to PHK, is a good example of judicialization.85 Five workers sued one of 
Indonesia's largest manufacturers of kretek (clove cigarettes), claiming that they had 
been hired in 2005 but denied a contract and unlawfully deprived of protection (as 
legitimate employees) from being wrongly dismissed. In this case, the five workers 
filed suit against their employer in Kediri, claiming that their requests for written 
contracts, which had been denied (even after the Kediri Manpower Bureau had issued 
a formal letter calling on the firm to resolve this problem), led the company to dismiss 
them unlawfully.
After receiving the Manpower Bureau's letter, the company chose mediation to 
resolve the standoff, but no agent or representative of the manufacturer appeared, even 
when called to meetings by the mediator. After receiving a judgment letter in their 
favor from the Manpower Bureau, the workers brought their case to the PHI. It was 
revealed during the PHI proceedings that four of the plaintiffs held law degrees, and 
all five had been managers within the firm's industrial relations division. The 
defendant (the plant director) never appeared nor did he send a representative when 
summoned by the PHI, and so the plaintiffs won their suit without contest and the PHI 
issued a decision ordering the company either to take them back or to pay them 
severance. The file contained no documents related to any appeal, but one can imagine 
the defendant may well have appealed, especially given the size of the firm and the 
relatively high profile of the disgruntled former employees.
As we can see, judicialization has not proceeded easily. Still, the Surabaya PHI 
clearly made significant efforts both to institutionalize a triadic dispute resolution 
framework for labor relations cases and to extend the power of the judiciary into 
previously ungoverned or administratively regulated spheres of social interaction.
Forum Shopping
In part because the PHIs' respective substantive and territorial jurisdictions are 
relatively well defined, I found few clear examples of forum-shopping behavior. There 
were still some, however. In one case of apparent forum shopping, a woman under 
investigation for embezzlement sued her former employer (a large corporation based 
in Jakarta, owned by a parent company in Singapore, in whose Surabaya branch she 
had worked) for wrongfully dismissing her, believing apparently that the PHI might 
present a more favorable venue than the Pengadilan Negeri.86 The plaintiff was fighting 
a pending criminal charge, but the suit she tried to press in the PHI was also 
tantamount to a civil suit for unlawful behavior (perbuatan melawan hukum, PMH)—not 
covered by the definition of PHI jurisdiction in Law 2.2004.
Despite the dubious validity of her case as a PHK issue, she was able to get a 
mediation decision in her favor from the Surabaya Manpower Bureau, but she rejected
85 Case No. 36/G/2006/PHI.SBY (file obtained from Surabaya PHI archive).
86 Case No. 116/G /2007/PHI.SBY (file obtained from Surabaya PHI archive).
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it as insufficient. In her filing with the PHI, the plaintiff claimed that managers and 
supervisors in both Surabaya and Jakarta were, in fact, corrupt (the plaintiff presented 
bank statements to illustrate this) and had framed her for embezzlement to cover up 
their own misdeeds. Her dismissal thus amounted to illegal behavior, and she 
demanded damages to cover debts she said she incurred by helping her superiors cook 
their books, in addition to normal severance.
Her employer disputed the bank statements and other basic facts, but argued more 
fundamentally that, as a PMH suit, the case did not belong in the PHI. The company 
also claimed that the plaintiffs attorney was an active-duty naval officer, and thus 
prohibited from representing clients in court. The case should thus either be dismissed 
or remanded to the Pengadilan Negeri for adjudication as a PMH suit, according to the 
company.
The PHI ruled for the plaintiff and ordered the company to pay her severance as 
well as back wages for the time during which her case was being adjudicated. Not 
surprisingly, the defendant appealed. The Supreme Court made clear that any issues 
related to allegations of embezzlement were a criminal issue under investigation by the 
police, concerning which charges were likely pending, and did not have any place in 
the PHI. The plaintiff thus could not ask for back wages or press a PHK claim unless 
and until she were cleared of criminal responsibility in the embezzlement case. On the 
PMH claims and legal representation issues, the Supreme Court's decision was less 
clear, deeming her suit a PHK, and not PMH, case, and ruling that the woman was 
indeed entitled to a modest severance package.
One of the clearest cases of territorial forum shopping I was able to track down 
from beyond Surabaya involved trade unions and a Japanese tire manufacturer—in a 
hak and kepentingan dispute over whether or not cost-of-living adjustments (perbaikan 
taraf hidup, or PTH) ought to be included as a component of wage increases in 
collectively bargained contracts between the unions and the firm. The company 
brought a suit in Central Jakarta, site of its head offices for Indonesia, claiming it never 
agreed in writing to such adjustments and that they therefore need not be included 
when calculating wages.87 The unions filed a parallel suit in Bandung, as the 
company's Indonesian tire factories were located in the West Java cities of Bekasi and 
Karawang, claiming that PTH adjustments had always been included by custom and 
that this pattern, once established, should be legally enforceable even without a written 
agreement.88
The contracts in question covered workers employed both at the downtown Jakarta 
offices and at the suburban manufacturing plants in West Java. Because of ambiguities 
regarding which PHI should have jurisdiction in such a case, both parties were able to 
see their suits over the same case go forward in separate courts. Perhaps predictably, 
the courts ruled differently, with Central Jakarta's siding with the company and West 
Java's (where the unions had won a mediation claim with the Manpower Bureau just 
before filing the suit) deciding in favor of the unions. Unfortunately, neither the two
87 Case No. 143/ PHI.G/2007/ PN.JKT.PST, decision document reproduced in Tjandra and Pangaribuan, 
Kompilasi Putusnn, pp. 633-85.
88 Case No. 90/G/2007/PHI.BDG, decision document reproduced in Tjandra and Pangaribuan, Kompilasi 
Putusan, pp. 686-735.
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PHIs nor the Supreme Court could use the case to establish a clear precedent regarding 
PHI jurisdiction. Instead, the tire manufacturer's Japanese parent company intervened 
preemptively from Tokyo to ensure that the workers received sufficient wage increases 
to stave off any possible strike action.89
Forum shopping may be a difficult pathology to ward off as PHIs take shape. 
Various authorities, including the Supreme Court, however, have engaged publicly to 
rein it in, and flagrant or blatant forum shopping appears to have been relatively rare 
in the sample cases I reviewed. The net result of the current rules on jurisdiction and 
the limited forum shopping opportunities that do exist, however, may well serve the 
political and economic interests of firms and the state better than those of workers.
Bureaucratic Competition
I did not find many cases of Mertha-type virtuous bureaucratic competition. There 
were more that seemed to follow a Migdal-type pattern, but even these were not 
always clear-cut. One interesting case of apparent bureaucratic competition involved 
workers dismissed from a rural wood-furniture factory.90 In this case, the PHI seems to 
have overstepped its boundaries to extend statutory rights to workers whose status 
and actions were not fully protected.
This was a complex dispute, involving both hak and PHK issues, which went 
through an appeal to the Supreme Court. Despite the questionable labor practices and 
uncooperative behavior of the defendant during the adjudication process, the Supreme 
Court sided with the employer and overturned upon appeal the PHI's original decision 
to grant the workers compensation (penggantian hak) and back wages. This decision 
was based on a finding that the workers' dismissal was tantamount to a lockout and 
that seasonal workers enjoy reduced protections. Also of note is that the East Java 
Metal Workers' Union became involved, filing an appellate brief (kontra memori kasasi) 
on behalf of the workers, despite their marginal status as seasonal rural workers.
There are a few cases in which it seems the PHI may have gone against earlier 
mediation or arbitration results to assert its independence or authority. In one such 
dispute, the court adjusted an earlier remedy to eliminate the requirement to pay back 
wages and reduce the severance due the plaintiff, who had been dismissed by his 
employer after an altercation with a customer.91 Neither side was pleased with this 
outcome—indeed, the reasoning of the court was not explained very clearly—yet the 
Supreme Court upheld the decision on appeal.
There are few clear cases of bureaucratic competition. Workers and unions have 
sometimes complained of what we might call "negative competition" among 
institutions keen to ignore them or avoid responsibility for addressing their grievances, 
and the opening of more institutional channels, perhaps ironically, has drastically 
increased the amount of time needed to resolve disputes or address grievances. Still,
89 Tjandra and Pangaribuan, Kompilasi Putusan, explanatory notes on pp. 631-32.
90 Case No. 130/G/2006/PHI.SBY (file obtained from Surabaya PHI archive).
91 Case No. 168/G / 2007/PHI.SBY (file obtained from Surabaya PHI archive).
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the newly reconfigured labor dispute resolution institutions appear to be establishing 
important boundary markers between their spheres of authority.
Something Completely Different?
There are a number of cases that suggest none of the three basic logics noted above. 
Some of these, especially earlier cases, suggest possible other dynamics—such as 
confusion or lack of knowledge concerning the PHI's mandate and jurisdiction, 
including regarding what sorts of suits could be brought. But even by 2009, judges and 
lawyers were often unclear on key points.
In the earliest case I examined, a disabled security guard (who was also a veteran of 
the 1945 independence struggle) sued his employer for unlawfully dismissing him.92 
He claimed he was asked to resign (and then denied severance) after suffering a stroke 
and becoming disabled. His employer refused one form of mediation and then failed to 
appear when called for another. Before the case reached the PHI, the Surabaya 
Manpower Bureau issued a letter ordering the employer to pay the guard severance, 
but this was ignored.
What stands out in this case is the degree to which both sides seem not to have 
focused on key basic facts. The plaintiff never established that his departure from the 
company was mandatory. The defendant never made the case that the plaintiff had 
resigned, but instead called a witness to testify that the company had a policy against 
paying (legally mandated) severance, presented documents to the same effect, and 
claimed the plaintiff had caused substantial damage to company property (but never 
argued that he had been dismissed with cause). The PHI appeared confused and 
unable to apply key provisions of Law 13.2003. Ultimately, it took the Supreme Court 
to decide, upon appeal, that the plaintiff was, in fact, owed severance pay because his 
departure was never established as either a resignation or dismissal for cause.
In some other cases, one or even both parties failed to appear in court on multiple 
occasions, either because they were never properly called or perhaps in a deliberate 
challenge to the PHI's authority. In one such case, a car loan service officer filed suit 
against his former employer (a large national corporation) for wrongful dismissal.93 
The plaintiff had gone through mediation and filed a decision letter in his favor from 
the Surabaya Manpower Bureau when he brought his suit. All his documents were in 
order, and the defendant's were incomplete. But he then failed three times to appear in 
court, causing the PHI to dismiss his case on the third occasion with only the 
defendant present.
A much more complicated case was also dismissed, but for different reasons.94 In 
this case, twenty-five workers (assisted by a labor lawyer) sued their former employer 
(a large furniture fittings and accessories manufacturer in Surabaya) for allegedly 
dismissing them improperly after a series of acrimonious shop-floor interactions. The 
workers claimed that six among them were fired without proper notices being issued.
92 Case No. 19/G/2006/PHI.SBY (file obtained from Surabaya PHI archive).
93 Case No. 50/G/2006/PHI.SBY (file obtained from Surabaya PHI archive).
94 Case No. 91/G/2007/PHI.SBY (file obtained from Surabaya PHI archive).
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Their employer claimed they had been absent from work (for three days, absences for 
which the workers said they had permission) and encouraged others to lodge 
complaints with the Manpower Bureau or even to strike. The other nineteen workers 
were summarily dismissed shortly after the first six were terminated, allegedly without 
any explanation or justification. The workers said that they had sought mediation, but 
management never appeared when called by the Manpower Bureau.
The defendant confirmed that there had been labor strife at the factory, but alleged 
that the plaintiffs had tried to coerce managers into working with a union that did not 
formally represent workers in the plant. The union had brought claims against the 
company to the East Java P4D and had won the case. The defendant had appealed to 
the P4P in January of 2006, just as the P4 system was giving way to the PHI, but the 
case was not decided before the PHI suit came to trial in July 2007. The defendant 
argued the PHI could not hear the case while the P4P decision was still pending (i.e., 
the suit was premature).
Both sides had substantial documentary evidence to back up their positions, but 
three witnesses were also called to testify. Two of these were workers at the plant. One 
had participated in a strike alongside the plaintiffs in 2005 over the defendant's alleged 
failure to pay wages in full, but she testified there were no ringleaders even though she 
claimed the workers had obtained a police permit. After the strike, all workers were 
retained and allowed to return to work, though the witness resigned voluntarily 
shortly after. She knew the plaintiffs had filed complaints, but had no other knowledge 
of the process or results. The second worker to testify knew even less about the case, 
only that the plaintiffs were permanent workers, while he was temporary. He said he 
left the firm when his contract expired and knew nothing about any goings-on 
afterwards. The last witness was a mediator from the Manpower Bureau, who 
confirmed that the defendant had failed to appear and that the plaintiffs had presented 
him with comprehensive documentary evidence in support of their version of the facts 
of the case. He also said the defendant told him explicitly that he would not appear 
unless and until the appellate decision from the P4P in the earlier filing were received. 
Finally, he maintained that the earlier P4 filing and the current PHI case were over 
separate issues.
The PHI ruled that the P4 case and the current suit were indeed separate issues. But 
the judges did not rule on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims. Instead, they dismissed 
the case as "unclear" (kalnir), based on problems with the form of the original filing, 
which had listed "Agus Sudiono et. al. [twenty-five people] workers" at the 
defendant's firm. The filing also failed to itemize the severance payments sought for 
each individual, stating instead that Rp.408,882,500 was sought for the whole group. 
The plaintiffs appealed the PHI's dismissal, but the Supreme Court upheld the PHI's 
reasoning and imposed additional court costs on the plaintiffs.
In a different case, the PHI seemed confused but defaulted to awarding damages to 
an aggrieved worker when neither side presented particularly strong evidence.95 The 
plaintiff—a worker fired by the Indonesian Music Foundation in Surabaya—made 
strong allegations that he and others had been dismissed improperly, though he did
95 Case No. 56/G/2008/PHI.SBY (file obtained from Surabaya PHI archive).
Indonesia's Courts of Industrial Relations 53
not support them well with evidence. The defendant did not present a forceful 
counter-argument and failed to show that the worker had either resigned or been fired 
for cause. The PHI deemed the employee's dismissal illegal and awarded generous 
damages and back pay and required that the foundation hire the plaintiff back. After 
the defense appealed, the Supreme Court amended the decision to remove the 
requirement to rehire the plaintiff and adjusted the total severance package 
downward.
Finally, in a less clear case, the PHI found for the plaintiff when the defendant 
presented an argument that perhaps should have won the day, and which the court 
almost certainly should have addressed carefully—specifically that the issue in play 
was not properly defined and that it mixed elements of hak and kepentingan.96 Still, the 
letter of Law 2.2004 is vague on exactly how this dispute should have been handled. 
The plaintiff, a disgruntled employee of a business services firm in Surabaya, sued his 
manager over a demotion (and pay cut) he had received. The plaintiff claimed to have 
received a "third warning" letter just prior to his demotion, without ever having 
received a first or second warning. He also maintained that the workplace rules and 
conditions of employment in the firm were not sufficiently clear.
The defendant said the suit was unclear (kabur and kurang jelas) because the 
plaintiff lacked comprehensive evidence of the full picture. He also argued that the suit 
mixed kepentingan (issues about the firm's workplace rules and whether or not these 
were actionable) with hak (concerning the specific terms of the plaintiff's contract and 
whether he was entitled to compensation for having received less pay than he'd been 
promised). The PHI ruled for the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to restore his old 
position and salary, as well as to pay back wages. It accepted his evidence (from his 
contract) of the salary he'd be promised and (from other documents) of the salary he'd 
received after his demotion, without considering the questions of whether the 
demotion and pay cut were reasonable and whether the workplace rules (or lack 
thereof) were actionable.
These cases do not show conclusively that any alternative logic or dynamic is in 
play in Surabaya, or throughout Indonesia. But they do raise doubts as to the 
applicability of judicialization, forum shopping, and bureaucratic competition for 
understanding the work of the PHI. With more in-depth analysis of a wider sampling 
of cases, it may be possible to develop a new lens or framework for better 
understanding how Indonesia's new labor dispute resolution institutions are coming 
into their own and the effects they are having on Indonesian politics and society.
Conclusion: Implications for Indonesian Legal Reform and Labor Politics
The picture for Indonesian legal reform presented by the PHIs in their first four 
years is decidedly mixed. On the one hand, Indonesia is among the leaders across the 
developing world in codifying labor rights, making them "legible" in court, and 
enhancing the political and social position of labor (at least on paper), even as it has 
eroded in most other countries. On the other hand, the system remains inchoate,
96 Case No. 121/G/2008/PHI.SBY (file obtained from Surabaya PHI archive).
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poorly utilized, little understood, and in occasional tension with other organs of the 
Indonesian state as well as its own history.
Many ad hoc judges have been paid salaries only sporadically, if at all.97 Many PHI 
judges, professional and ad hoc alike, are also said to be incompetent, lacking even a 
thorough knowledge of relevant Indonesian jurisprudence.98 There have also been at 
least a few high-profile cases of corruption, including a recent sensational bribery 
scandal involving an ad hoc PHI judge in Bandung.99
Inconsistency, even within one court, is a frequently encountered problem in the 
PHIs' operations.100 Such inconsistency can erode public confidence in the new court 
system as an institution. Until standards become more uniform and decisions more 
enforceable, it is unlikely that the PHI courts will be able to perform any more 
meaningful or influential role in Indonesian politics and society, which means they will 
remain only a slight improvement over the P4 system.
On this last point, the PHIs are able to adjudicate a much broader array of rights 
and claims than the P4 institutions they replaced. The rules governing them are more 
favorable to labor, and workers are permitted, even encouraged, to file cases 
proactively. The PHIs are also meant to be independent of the executive authority of 
the state and to provide a more neutral venue for dispute resolution. Despite these 
advantages, they have not clearly or consistently enhanced workers' power in the 
political arena.
In a less advantageous reversal of the P4 norms, workers must now take the 
initiative to file PHK cases. Whereas employers used to be required to petition the P4D 
or P4P for approval to dismiss employees, the onus is now on workers to petition the 
PHI to block dismissals. Even when cases are brought, workers must pursue a lengthy 
and uncertain process before finally receiving a theoretically enforceable judgment, 
which is by no means always in their favor. Expanded opportunities for adjudication 
have produced at least the potential for increased uncertainty, longer processing times, 
and a greater chance that plaintiffs will simply be ignored.
Much work remains to be done before we can confidently outline even the basic 
contours of Indonesia's PHI. But already a number of key issues and themes are 
starting to emerge. By continuing to think systematically about the political and legal 
dynamics and processes that might underlie their functioning, we can come to a better 
understanding both of how the PHIs work, and also of the roles they are likely 
beginning to play in the changing political and social landscape of labor relations in 
post-New Order Indonesia.
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